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10.1  Introduction 
In recent years, there has been heightened concern about poor fiscal out- 
comes in both developed and developing countries. Governments have had to 
reduce aggregate public spending and deficits due to serious macroeconomic 
imbalances. At the same time, governments have had to focus attention on the 
composition of  spending in deciding where to cut expenditures, that is, in- 
crease allocative efficiency. Moreover, many have recognized the need to ad- 
dress often serious problems with technical inefficiency in the use of budgeted 
resources (World Bank  1993). But while policymakers and researchers have 
recognized these three basic problems,  for the most  part  they have not ad- 
dressed  them  in  an  integrated  manner.  In  particular,  the  interrelationships 
among these problems have not been systematically examined. Macroecono- 
mists  have  focused  on the  control  of  aggregate  spending  and  the  deficit. 
Experts in public administration  have worked predominantly  on improving 
technical  efficiency. And  fiscal economists have concentrated  on  issues  of 
allocative efficiency.  I 
Further, much of the work on these issues has not dealt with the underlying 
institutional arrangements that affect the outcomes. Indeed recently, there has 
been a fluny of work on the role of institutions in influencing aggregate fiscal 
discipline (Alesina et al. 1996; von Hagen 1992). But this work has not ad- 
dressed the implications of these and other institutional arrangements on allo- 
cative and technical efficiency. 
J. Edgardo Campos is senior economist at the Economic Development Institute of the World 
Bank. Sanjay Pradhan is sector leader of  the Public Sector and Institutional Reform unit of  the 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia Region of the World Bank. 
1. The World Bank, for instance, has devoted enormous resources to carrying out public expen- 
diture reviews to evaluate public expenditure allocations. 
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The relative lack of  attention to coherence and institutional underpinnings 
stems in part from the absence of an analytical framework within which to 
evaluate a public expenditure management system. In this paper, we present 
such a framework. Specifically, we examine how institutional arrangements 
(i.e., the rules, norms, procedures) governing the budget process affect incen- 
tives governing the allocation and use of  resources. Using theories from the 
new institutional economics to guide us, we identify key theoretical problems 
that underpin any public expenditure management system. We then construct 
a set of  generic institutional arrangements each of which can potentially  ad- 
dress one or more of  the problems and link with each arrangement relevant 
accountability-  andor transparency-enhancing  mechanisms.  We  categorize 
these arrangements and mechanisms according to their relative impact on three 
levels or categories of expenditure outcomes-the  aggregate level of spending 
and the deficit, the composition of expenditures, and the technical efficiency 
in the use of budgeted resources. On the basis of this categorization, we are 
able to develop a parsimonious measure of the potential effectiveness of a sys- 
tem with respect to each of the three expenditure categories. We are then able 
to systematically examine key features of reform efforts, particularly the inter- 
linkages, and are able to correlate the “quality” of public expenditure systems 
with expenditure outcomes. 
Through our methodology, we are able to capture the principal changes that 
the radical reforms in New Zealand and Australia introduced. We are able to 
show that the New Zealand reforms have been geared to achieving aggregate 
fiscal discipline and enhancing technical efficiency, and that formal mecha- 
nisms for transparency and accountability have been central to these reforms. 
The data reveal that our measures, the slack coefficients, are correlated with 
expenditure outcomes (e.g., reduction in fiscal discipline and unit costs of ser- 
vice delivery).  Our slack coefficients  for Australia confirm that the thrust of 
the reforms was to focus attention on strategic priorities and achieve a signifi- 
cant shift away from central to line agencies as the source of savings in order 
to achieve aggregate fiscal targets. The result has been a dramatic reduction in 
the level of spending and deficits, and more significantly, large churnings in 
the composition of spending of a highly activity-specific nature. 
This paper is divided into five sections. In the following section, we present 
the analytical framework and identify the key institutional arrangements that 
define the parameters of a public expenditure management  system. We also 
construct indices to represent each of the key institutional arrangements, and 
we show how the indices can be used to derive three measures of the potential 
effectiveness of a system with respect to the three categories of expenditure 
outcomes. In section  10.3, we describe  the pre- and postreform  systems of 
New Zealand and Australia, apply the methodology developed in section 10.2 
to derive the measures of potential effectiveness for each system, and correlate 
changes in these  measures with changes in expenditure  outcomes. We  then 235  Budgetary Institutions and Expenditure Outcomes 
compare the two postrefonn  systems and derive some implications for the 
study of budgeting systems. In section 10.4 we discuss recent developments in 
the reforms in each country. We conclude the paper with a brief discussion of 
directions for future research in this relatively nascent area. 
10.2  The Analytical Framework 
Understanding the intricacies of a country’s public expenditure management 
system is a complicated and demanding task. In this paper, we attempt to un- 
ravel the complications that arise in constructing an effective public expendi- 
ture management system, to present a methodology for characterizing the sys- 
tem  parsimoniously without  losing its essential features, and to undertake 
some correlations of  system characterizations and expenditure outcomes. To 
organize our approach, we categorize expenditure outcomes according to three 
basic objectives that any system needs to achieve: (i) to instill aggregatejscal 
discipline, (ii) to facilitate strategic prioritization  of expenditures across pro- 
grams and projects, and (iii) to encourage technical eficiency in the use of 
budgeted resources, that is, achieve outputs at the lowest possible cost. 
Three distinct but interrelated theoretical problems impinge on the task of 
achieving the above objectives. The first has to do with what is known as the 
tragedy of  the commons. Disparate claimants on government spending view 
the budget as a common resource pool into which they can dip with little or 
no cost. The second pertains to information revelation and “vote cycling” prob- 
lems that primarily impede the strategic prioritization of expenditures across 
sectors and programs. The third involves information asymmetry and incentive 
incompatibilities within the government hierarchy (e.g., the principal-agent re- 
lationship between the central and line ministries), which can impede the effi- 
cient allocation and use of  budgeted resources. Each of  these problems can 
affect expenditure outcomes adversely. Each is inherently difficult to resolve. 
Together they present a formidable task. 
To guide us in our analysis, we use theories from the new institutional eco- 
nomics to help us identify key institutional arrangements that can help address 
these problems. We  describe each of these arrangements, explain briefly how 
they work, and indicate why they can help resolve one or more of these prob- 
lems. From this, we are then able to piece together a set of institutional arrange- 
ments that can potentially make for an effective public expenditure manage- 
ment system. 
Institutional arrangements, however, need not necessarily have any effect. 
For them to be binding, mechanisms that make adherence or nonadherence to 
these rules transparent and that hold the government and its ministries account- 
able  for bad  performance are necessary. Transparency and  accountability 
mechanisms impose implicit costs on politicians and bureaucrats for violating 
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10.2.1  Aggregate Fiscal Discipline and the Tragedy of the Commons 
Aggregate fiscal discipline is impeded by the so-called tragedy of the com- 
mons. There are many claimants to the budget, for example, interest groups, 
legislators, line ministries. Each has different preferences for the manner in 
which the budget is to be allocated, that is, the composition of spending, and 
each exerts pressure on the government  to bias spending in the direction of 
their preferences. Given that taxes are collected from the general public, the 
tax burden of  a claimant’s spending priorities, which is spread across many 
groups and individuals, is likely to be considerably lower than the total social 
cost of the implied programs. On the other hand, the benefits accrue mostly to 
the claimant. Consequently, a claimant will always demand a level of spending 
on its desired programs  that exceeds the level that is socially  optimaL2 For 
these reasons, constraints on the aggregate level of spending and deficits over 
the medium term become important. Absent  any constraint, meeting the de- 
mands of disparate claimants is likely to result in large, unsustainable deficits 
that translate  into an unstable macroeconomic  environment-high  inflation, 
high interest rates, burgeoning current account deficits-which  can ultimately 
retard growth.’ 
Key  institutional  arrangements  that can help  mitigate the tragedy  of  the 
commons, together  with  associated transparency  and  accountability mecha- 
nisms are summarized in part  1 of  table  10.1. The tragedy  of  the commons 
problem  can  be  mitigated  by  introducing  a  medium-term  macroeconomic 
framework into discussions of  the budget,  granting the central ministries  a 
dominant position on decisions concerning aggregate spending, and by estab- 
lishing  formal  constraints  on  spending  and  borrowing.  A  macroeconomic 
framework provides a basis for evaluating the implications of the public expen- 
diture  program  for  macroeconomic  variables  and  gives  the  government  a 
means to have claimants incorporate the real cost of inflation as well as implied 
changes in other macro variables into their decision calculus. It would be im- 
portant, however, for all public expenditures, including extrabudgetary funds, 
to be included in the macroeconomic framework; in Ukraine in  1991 for in- 
stance, extrabudgetary funds accounted for about 12 percent of GDP and were 
not incorporated in the macro framework. To be effective, the macroeconomic 
framework needs to be supported by underlying institutional arrangements that 
ensure coordination among the key central agencies. For example in Thailand, 
the four central agencies-the  Central Bank, the Budget Bureau, the Ministry 
of Finance, and the Planning Ministry-work  closely to develop and monitor 
an internally consistent set of macro aggregates. 
2. See Weingaat, Shepsle, and Johnsen 1981 for a more detailed discussion of this issue. 
3. This is consistent with the observation that macroeconomic crisis generally induces govern- 
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Table 10.1  Key Institutional Arrangements  and Expenditure Outcomes 
Institutional Arrangements  Accountability  Transparency 
1. Aggregate fiscal discipline 
A. Macro framework and coordination 
B. Dominance of central ministries 
C. Formal constraints 
mechanisms 
D. Hard budget constraints 
E. Comprehensiveness of budget 
A. Forward estimates 
2. Prioritization 
B. Comprehensiveness of  the budget 
C. Flexibility of line agencies 
D. Breadth of  consultations 
E. Use of objective criteria 
A. Civil service pay and merit-based 
B. Managerial autonomy of line 
C. Predictability of resource flow 
3. Technical efficiency 
recruitment/promotion 
agencies 
Ex post reconciliation 
Sanctions 




Ex post evaluations 
Hard budget 
constraint 
Technical capacity of 
parliament 











Freedom of  the press 
Published 





Freedom of the press 
Line ministries and other claimants have relatively parochial views on the 
budget. By virtue of  their mandates  and jurisdictions, the central ministries 
are better able to evaluate the big picture of  which aggregate spending and 
macroeconomic trends are major components. Hence, the tragedy of the com- 
mons can also be mitigated by granting the central ministries dominance over 
aggregate spending. In Thailand, for instance, the four central agencies have 
had considerable autonomy and authority in setting aggregate fiscal targets; 
there have been only two years in the last few decades where the cabinet or the 
parliament has ovemdden their targets. 
Given the nature of politics in many countries, however, this may  not be 
enough. There will be constant pressure from claimants to expand the budget 
envelope. Establishing explicit rules that put specific limits on spending and 
borrowing and that impose penalties on overspending by  line ministries can 
give the central ministries more leverage over claimants, that is, increase their 
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objective, predetermined rules to defend their decisions. Similarly, Indonesia’s 
constitutional balanced-budget law prohibits the government from incurring 
any domestic borrowing. 
In theory, then, aggregate fiscal discipline will depend upon (i) the existence 
of a medium-term expenditure framework based upon a consistent macroeco- 
nomic program; (ii) the relative dominance of the central ministries; and (iii) 
the existence of formal constraints on spending and deficits. But while such 
rules may exist on paper, they may not be binding. The following mechanisms 
can help improve accountability and/or transparency and thus impose political 
costs on politicians and bureaucrats for violating the rules: (i) reconciliation be- 
tween ex ante and ex post aggregate spending and deficits; (ii) sanctions against 
overspending; (iii) publication and dissemination of the results to the public; 
and  (iv) integration of  all expenditures  within  the budget,  including extra- 
budgetary funds. New Zealand offers the most dramatic example of account- 
ability and transparency mechanisms that bind the government  to aggregate 
fiscal discipline. The contract of the governor of the central bank is explicitly 
linked to inflation, and the contract of the minister of finance is linked to aggre- 
gate fiscal performance. Further, the government is legally required to commit 
itself to aggregate fiscal targets, and is legally bound to full and frequent dis- 
closure. Open financial markets have exerted a disciplining force with the pub- 
lication  of  this data. Similarly, Indonesia’s balanced-budget law does not by 
itself exert a binding influence because while it prohibits domestic borrowing, 
it allows external borrowing; external discipline is in fact exerted by open capi- 
tal accounts in Indonesia. 
Indeed, the openness of  financial  markets represents a subtle mechanism 
that imposes accountability on the government for maintaining aggregate fiscal 
discipline. Open financial markets can potentially act as a disciplining device 
on the government even in the absence of other mechanisms. If the government 
decides to run a large deficit, institutional investors and fund managers may 
perceive this to imply macroeconomic problems down the road, such as infla- 
tion, devaluation, and so on, and thus may decide to pull their funds out and 
move them to other countries. Should this happen then the government is likely 
to confront a macroeconomic crisis, which would likely have serious political 
repercussions. In short, open financial markets make it politically costly for 
the government to run a large defi~it.~ 
10.2.2  Strategic Prioritization, Transactions Costs, and Consensus Building 
Given aggregate fiscal discipline, the second key challenge is how to priori- 
tize competing claims on scarce resources. Once again, the underlying prob- 
lem is the tragedy of the commons, which creates a tension among competing 
4. Indeed, our preliminary explorations (Campos, Davoodi, and Pradhan 1995) into this issue 
suggests that more open financial markets tend to reduce  the relative size of  budget  deficits 
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claims from individuals and groups. But there are two additional problems that 
make prioritization difficult: high transactions costs in getting feedback to and 
from civil society about how to map expenditures onto preferences, and infor- 
mation asymmetries within the government hierarchy characterized by the fact 
that line agencies possess better information about how best to allocate expen- 
ditures within their mandates. 
Prioritization is fundamentally a political process. Politicians will set priori- 
ties based upon their understanding of the preferences of their constituencies: 
the key here is whether there are institutional arrangements that improve the 
quality of information needed to do this effectively. Key institutional arrange- 
ments  and  their  associated  transparency  and  accountability  mechanisms, 
which can facilitate prioritization, are summarized in part 2 of table 10.1. 
Invariably the tragedy of the commons will create demands in excess of the 
constraints. This raises the transactions costs of  collective decision making 
within the political process because it creates a situation in which individuals 
and groups will strive to restructure coalitions in order to enlarge their share 
of a fixed pie.5  This implies the need for institutional arrangements that help 
build consensus among the competing groups on the relative expenditure allo- 
cations.6 
Consensus building requires information on what trade-offs are being made, 
including what everyone is having to give up and gain, together with a vision 
of  future benefits that will derive from current sacrifices. Thus for prioritiza- 
tion, the most important arrangement is likely to be a process that articulates 
and seeks consensus over strategic outcomes that expenditures seek to achieve 
in the medium term and that links expenditure allocations with these strategic 
outcomes. This could include, for instance, a decision-making mechanism in 
the cabinet to decide upon strategic priorities informed by  a system for com- 
paring the medium-term costs of competing policies within a given hard bud- 
get constraint. 
Line ministries have better information on how best to allocate resources 
within their sectors to achieve given objectives. Consequently, a complemen- 
tary arrangement that would economize on transactions costs would be to give 
them the flexibility to determine what new programs to introduce and what 
existing programs to cut; that is, by  allocating resources within their ceilings, 
information costs are reduced. For as long as line ministries can be held ac- 
countable for their performance (through reconciliations and ex post evalua- 
tions) and their performance is made transparent, they will tend to use the 
information they possess (but which central ministries and politicians do not) 
to allocate their ceilings to achieve their given objectives. 
Australia offers the best example of such a priority-setting process. The pro- 
cess engenders strong focus on strategic outcomes that expenditure programs 
5. Theoretically this refers to the problem of  “vote” cycling (see McKelvey 1976). 
6. On the U.S. Congress, see Weingast 1979; Krehbiel 1991; Shepsle 1979. 240  J. Edgardo Campos and Sanjay Pradhan 
are seeking to achieve, and incorporates a medium-term expenditure frame- 
work that link allocations to the achievement of these outcomes. At the cabinet 
level, the process focuses on evaluating and setting strategic priorities based 
upon medium-cost estimates of spending and savings options identified by line 
agencies as well as by  the cabinet. Line ministries are given a hard budget 
constraint consistent with these intersectoral priorities, but then given flexibil- 
ity to reallocate resources within their portfolios. These medium-term costs of 
policies, called forward estimates, are rolled over into future budgets provided 
policies do not change. This lowers transaction costs and helps focus attention 
on changes in strategic priorities. Accountability is achieved through the hard 
constraint, reporting on results or outcomes, and a strong emphasis on ex post 
reconciliations and evaluations. Australia, for instance, publishes a reconcilia- 
tion table with its budget showing the deviations between last year’s forward 
estimates and this year’s proposed allocations. This is accompanied by an ex- 
planation of the observed deviations. Australia also undertakes systematic ex 
post evaluations of  its programs. Among developing countries, Colombia is 
launching the most ambitious program of ex post evaluations, and Malawi is 
attempting to institute a priority-setting process along the lines of Australia’s. 
A credible priority-setting process also requires that all expenditures be in- 
corporated into the budget. In other words, the budget needs to be comprehen- 
sive. The existence of extrabudgetary funds and/or the exclusion of certain ex- 
penditure categories, for example, subsidies to public enterprises, is likely to 
weaken the ability of decision makers to allocate expenditures to achieve stra- 
tegic outcomes. For instance, considerable earmarking of resources for partic- 
ular expenditures in several Latin American countries (e.g., Colombia) effec- 
tively removes large chunks of  expenditures from the prioritization process. 
Comprehensiveness or unity of the budget is perhaps the second most impor- 
tant arrangement for prioritization. 
There is also a need to establish impersonal rules for evaluating the relative 
importance of programs and projects to complement the prioritization process. 
Since impersonal rules apply equally to every program and project, the govern- 
ment cannot be as easily accused of favoritism and thus is better able to defend 
itself against criticism. The use of  economic cost-benefit analysis and inci- 
dence analysis are examples of such rules. The first can provide information 
on the net social gain, while the second can potentially make transparent who 
gains and who loses. These rules can thereby help claimants evaluate trade- 
offs more objectively and thus arrive at agreements more quickly. 
To build a consensus, the decision-making process also needs to extract in- 
formation about the preferences of different claimants, that is, determine the 
demand curve. Decisions have to be made about broad strategic priorities, for 
this determines ministerial objectives, ceilings, and allocations over the me- 
dium term. But again asymmetries in information between the government and 
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arrangements that lower the costs of transmitting the information about social 
preferences to government and thus in determining broad strategic pri~rities.~ 
Broad consultations that involve representatives of claimants and that incor- 
porate feedback and provide oversight at relatively low transactions cost can 
help arrive at strategic priorities. The most extensive, tractable form of  such 
consultations is likely to involve parliamentary discussions of the budget. Par- 
liamentarians represent some segment of the population as well as certain in- 
terest groups. Moreover, parliamentary committees and subcommittees gener- 
ally evaluate specific components of  the overall public expenditure program. 
So by exposing proposed public expenditure allocations to parliamentary scru- 
tiny, feedback can be obtained on the appropriateness of the priorities and ad- 
justments made accordingly. 
In some countries, corporatist arrangements tend to complement if not dom- 
inate parliamentary procedures.8 In  such cases, representatives from various 
sectors in society become an important sounding board of the government. It 
is helpful if not necessary to create a forum through which these representa- 
tives can comment on and criticize budget  proposal^.^ In any  case, opinion 
surveys can help identify broad priorities that discussions with parliament and/ 
or representatives of corporatist groups can refine. 
Critical  to  the  success  of  the  demand-revealing (and  thus  consensus- 
building) mechanisms is a set of  rules or criteria that introduces incentives 
for “shared sacrifice”; that is, claimants agree to smaller allocations within a 
constrained budget envelope. This suggests the need for commitment devices 
that insure claimants that their current sacrifices will result in future benefits 
and that each one will bear some part of the burden.1° Hence, mechanisms that 
hold government accountable for allocating resources accordingly and making 
those allocations transparent become important. Unless claimants can be sure 
that the government will indeed allocate resources accordingly, they will be 
much less willing to support any proposed allocation, reducing the likelihood 
that a consensus can be reached. 
Consensus building is really about creating institutional arrangements for 
claimants and the government to exploit potential gains from trade, that is, 
logrolling. Hence, for a consensus to emerge, arrangements that address log- 
rolling problems are needed. There is by  now a considerable literature on this 
in the context of the United States (see Shepsle and Weingast 1994 for a litera- 
ture survey). However, much of  this discussion is premised on the fact that 
7. In practice what this has usually meant is for the cabinet to propose ministerial ceilings and 
intraministerial allocations and for broad consultations to inform the cabinet of changes that need 
to be made to conform more closely to preferences of claimants from civil society. 
8. See Staniland 1985 for a definition and discussion of corporatism. 
9. In Malaysia, for example, the Budget Dialogue Group, which consists of representatives from 
all major sectors including NGOs and industry groups, meets annually to discuss budget priorities 
for the coming year and to comment on the previous year’s allocations. 
10. See Campos and Esafahani 1996 and Campos and Root 1996 for a discussion of this issue. 242  J. Edgardo Campos and Sanjay Pradhan 
individuals and groups are willing to behave according to the rules of the game. 
In much of the developing world, this cannot be presumed. The rules are not 
very transparent, and public officials are not held sufficiently accountable for 
their actions. Hence, politicians and public officials have very little incentive 
to behave according to the rules. This of course makes trades among different 
parties difficult since it creates an environment in which individuals may re- 
nege on agreements without fear of being penalized. 
Increasing transparency and improving accountability make it more costly 
for politicians and public officials to violate rules and thus renege on agree- 
ments. Publishing the expenditure allocations and the agreed-upon (i.e., strate- 
gic) outcomes embodied in the expenditure plan and publicizing these (i.e., 
making the budget transparent) make it more difficult for both politicians and 
officials to alter things midstream without sufficient cause since they will have 
to defend any such action before the general public. Institutionalizing a process 
of reconciling actual expenditures of ministries with their annual budgeted al- 
locations as well as reconciling their forward estimates with subsequent budget 
requests and publicizing all such reconciliations will induce the government 
to stick to the expenditure priorities (except when there are large exogenous 
shocks, and even then the government will have to provide a good explanation). 
Moreover, undertaking regular ex post evaluations of major ministerial pro- 
grams and publicizing  the results makes line ministries more responsive  to 
producing the outputs that they have promised to produce over the medium- 
term period. 
Closely linked to the above transparency and accountability mechanisms is 
the need to provide parliament with sufficient resources to hire and maintain a 
staff with the technical capacity to evaluate government programs and propos- 
als. If parliament can adequately scrutinize government performance, then the 
government will be under more pressure to deliver on what it has promised in 
the expenditure plan. 
In summary, institutional arrangements that can facilitate prioritization in- 
clude  (i) an expenditure  planning process linked to the  achievement of  af- 
fordable outcomes, including a process to identify and discuss the medium- 
term costs of competing priorities at the cabinet level; (ii) flexibility for line 
agencies to make intrasectoral allocations; (iii) comprehensiveness of the bud- 
get; (iv) a process that allows feedback from claimants that inform priority 
setting; and (v) the use of objective criteria. Accountability and transparency 
mechanisms that can help bind the politicians and bureaucrats to the achieve- 
ment of  these strategic outcomes include (i) reconciliation of ex ante and ex 
post allocations; (ii) reconciliation of budgetary allocations with forward esti- 
mates; (iii) reconciliation of ex ante and ex post outcomes, including ex post 
evaluations; (iv) public dissemination of the results; (v) hard budget constraint 
to create incentives to prioritize expenditures; (vi) integration of all expendi- 
tures (e.g., extrabudgetary funds) into budgetary deliberations; and (vii) build- 
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10.2.3  Technical Efficiency and Incentive Incompatibilities 
Assuming  that  an  aggregate  level  and  a  prioritization  of  expenditures 
emerges from the above arrangements, there still remains the principal agent 
problem within the government hierarchy. Information asymmetries and incen- 
tive incompatibilities can impede the efficient delivery of public services by 
line agencies and their civil servants. Because of their closeness to the clients 
and their involvement in day-to-day operations in a specific sector or subsector, 
line ministries and their agencies possess superior information about how best 
to implement programs to achieve the intended results. It thus becomes imper- 
ative for the government to grant the line ministries a sufficient degree of man- 
agerial autonomy over the specific allocations and the responsibility to imple- 
ment their respective budgets. 
The capacity of line agencies for efficient delivery of services depends also 
on the predictability of the flow of budgetary resources. Unless a line agency 
can be certain of how much it is going to get over the fiscal year, it will not be 
able to make definite plans and therefore cannot make efficient allocations. For 
instance, in several African countries, the budget is remade during the year, 
and line agencies face considerable uncertainty in making their expenditure 
plans for the fiscal year. At the opposite extreme, the expenditure process in 
Australia with its requirement of automatically folding forward estimates (ab- 
sent major policy changes) of  line agencies into their annual budgets intro- 
duces a high degree of predictability. 
Managerial autonomy and predictability will not produce desirable results 
unless the civil service in line agencies attracts competent individuals.  A neces- 
sary requisite to do this is adequate compensation. In this regard, among the 
more  critical  arrangements is  a  compensation scheme that  closely aligns 
public-sector with  private-sector  compensation. However this  arrangement 
needs to be complemented by  a merit-based recruitment and promotion sys- 
tem. Without such a system, competency will not be rewarded appropriately, 
which will  affect the morale and thus the incentives of  civil servants. The 
worst-case scenario is one in which promotions and recruitment are based 
solely on political connections and influence. In such cases, high salaries will 
tend to go to those who are most well connected, and civil servants will tend 
to concentrate on establishing such connections rather than on accomplishing 
their tasks efficiently. 
Autonomy and competence of line agencies are necessary but not sufficient 
for technical efficiency. Indeed, there is no guarantee that the line ministries, 
despite their superior information, will implement their budgeted programs in 
ways  that will achieve the intended results at the lowest possible cost. They 
could just as well use their budget inappropriately, for example, for personal 
or parochial gain. Hence, they have to be made accountable for the allocational 
decisions that they make, and for the efficient delivery of services. An appro- 
priate balance between autonomy and accountability of the line agencies has 244  J. Edgardo Campos and Sanjay Pradhan 
to be struck. Accountability will depend upon (i) publication of financial ac- 
counts and with what lags; (ii) publication of  financial audits and with what 
lags; (iii) the extent of oversight of financial accounts and audits by groups in 
civil society (e.g., parliamentary subcommittees); (iv) clarity of outputs of or- 
ganizational units; (v) contestability in the delivery of  outputs; (vi) tenure of 
agency heads; (vii) implicit or explicit performance contracts for agency heads 
and their employees; (viii) extent of performance audits and their publication; 
and (ix) the use of client surveys. The publication and general dissemination 
of  their results, that is, making them transparent, will contribute further to the 
effectiveness of these arrangements. 
To sum up, then, technical efficiency in the use of budgeted resources will 
depend upon the relative autonomy of line agencies and the extent to which 
they can be held accountable for performance, the predictability of  resource 
flows into ministerial budgets, the competence of line agency bureaucrats, and 
the extent to which recruitment and promotion is based on merit. In part 3 of 
table 10.1, we present a capsule summary of the arrangements and accountabil- 
ityhransparency mechanisms that can help make government delivery of pub- 
lic services more technically efficient. 
10.2.4  Interactions and Trade-offs among the Three 
Levels of Expenditure Outcomes 
Above, we have summarized the institutional  arrangements, transparency, 
and accountability mechanisms that can help achieve each the three basic ob- 
jectives discussed above. Table 10.1 summarizes this matrix. This represents 
a diagnostic framework that can be used to analyze the impact of  budgetary 
institutions on expenditure outcomes in particular countries. 
In this regard, it is critical to underscore two central points: (i) there are 
interactions among the three levels of expenditure outcomes and their institu- 
tional arrangements; and (ii) budgeting systems face trade-offs among the lev- 
els of expenditure outcomes that they are geared toward. As the analyses below 
illustrate, how countries control aggregate spending affects the way they deal 
with budgetary  allocations  and the efficiency with  which line agencies use 
their budgets, and conversely as well. These considerations induce trade-offs 
in terms of  which category  of  expenditure outcomes to focus on. It is this 
emphasis on interactions and trade-offs that distinguishes our approach from 
other recent studies that have focused exclusively on institutional arrangements 
that contribute to aggregate fiscal discipline (e.g., Alesina et al. 1996; von Ha- 
gen 1992). 
10.2.5  Constructing a Measurable Representation of a 
Public Expenditure Management System 
To characterize a public expenditure management  system, we need to de- 
velop a parsimonious representation of  the system that captures its principal 
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Fig. 10.1  New Zealand-prereform  aggregate fiscal discipline 
we construct an index for each of the institutional arrangements and, where 
applicable, for corresponding transparency and accountability mechanisms. 
The arrangements, mechanisms, and associated indices are presented in detail 
in Campos and Pradhan 1996. 
For a country-specific public expenditure management system, we  assign 
index values to each of  the institutional arrangements and transparency/ac- 
countability mechanisms in the table. The values are based on responses of an 
expert on the country's budgeting process to a diagnostic questionnaire that we 
have prepared as well as an in-depth analysis provided by the expert. For two 
mechanisms, the openness of financial markets and the freedom of the press, 
we used objective indices developed elsewhere. Because it is accountability 
and transparency that bind the governments to institutional arrangements, we 
give a weight of  ?k  to the arrangement, '/3 to the transparency mechanism, 
and  '/2 to the accountability mechanisms and derive a weighted index for the 
arrangement cum mechanisms. Where there are no transparency and/or ac- 
countability mechanisms, we normalize weights so that the sum of the weights 
for all applicable factors is 1. For example, if there are no mechanisms associ- 
ated with an arrangement, then the arrangement gets a full weight of  1, and its 
weighted index will be equal to its index value. Based on this, we are able to 
construct a parsimonious representation of each of the three categories of the 
system in the form of  a chart and a corresponding slack coefficient roughly 
analogous to the Gini coefficient measure of income inequality. For example, 
figure  10.1 illustrates the relative slack of  New  Zealand's  prereform (circa 
1983) system with respect to aggregate fiscal discipline. There are five institu- 
tional arrangements under this expenditure category (see table lO.l), repre- 
sented as A, B, C, D, and E in the horizontal axis. We  give equal weights to 
each of  these arrangements and assign a maximum height of  1 to each. The 
actual country-specific height corresponding to each arrangement is given by 246  J. Edgardo Campos and Sanjay Pradhan 
the weighted  index associated with it, for instance, for A this  is 0.325. The 
unshaded portion represents the slack of the system with respect to aggregate 
fiscal discipline. Its area (4.18) as a proportion of the total area of the chart (5) 
gives the corresponding slack coefficient -0.837. 
Some  arrangements  are  themselves  characterized  by  subarrangements 
nested in them. In such cases, we take the average of the actual index values 
assigned to each of the subarrangements and use that as the index value for 
the arrangement. 
There are also accountability and transparency mechanisms that apply to 
a whole category. These are the openness of  financial markets, which is an 
accountability mechanism, and the relative freedom of the press, which is a 
transparency mechanism. Both mechanisms are essentially  exogenous to the 
public expenditure system. For the case of openness of financial markets, we 
adjust each accountability mechanism under aggregate fiscal discipline by tak- 
ing the average of the mechanism’s index value and the index value for open- 
ness. For the case of freedom of the press, we multiply each relevant transpar- 
ency mechanism by the index value for freedom of the press. 
In the case of the prioritization and technical efficiency categories, we assign 
different weights to each of the arrangements cum accountability/transparency 
mechanisms based on implications of the preceding analysis. For instance, un- 
der technical efficiency, we give line agency accountability twice the weight 
of competency and autonomy. Without accountability, competency and auton- 
omy can translate into abuse and misuse of resources. With accountability, the 
government and in particular the line agencies will have strong incentives to 
improve the overall level of competency and to try to use their autonomy to 
meet their objectives at least cost. Specifically, under technical efficiency, we 
assign weights of .5, S,  and  1 respectively to arrangements A, B, and C and, 
under prioritization, weights of 1, .8, .6, .4, .2 respectively to arrangements A 
through E (see table 10.  l), given their decreasing order of importance as sug- 
gested by  our analytical framework. In the country-specific analyses, we un- 
dertake some sensitivity  analysis by  comparing our results with the weights 
with results based on equal weights for each arrangement (Campos and Prad- 
han 1996). 
10.3  New Zealand and Australia 
10.3.1  New Zealand 
Faced with a severe economic crisis and a heavily interventionist  state not 
dissimilar from former  Eastern  European  centrally  planned  economies,  the 
government of New Zealand undertook a sequence of radical institutional re- 
forms that sought to completely redefine the role and revamp the functioning 
of government. The reforms proceeded in four general stages as embodied in 
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Finance Act  (1989), and  the  Fiscal Responsibility Act  (1993). The  State- 
Owned Enterprise Act took the state out of production activities that the private 
sector could just as well provide competitively. The act formed the basis of the 
strategic focus of  the reforms that followed. The State Sector Act abolished 
the permanent tenure of  civil servants by  putting agency heads on five-year 
(renewable) performance contracts and granting them the authority to hire and 
fire employees within their jurisdiction. It also introduced the notion of split- 
ting an agency into two or more focused business units, for example, one as 
the fundedpurchaser and another as the provider. The Public Finance Act intro- 
duced two innovations: first, it enhanced the transparency of public financial 
statements by requiring that all such statements be put on an accrual account- 
ing basis and be published and made available to the general public; and sec- 
ond, it  improved accountability by  mandating that  any given appropriation 
must be linked to one of  seven categories, the main one being outputs. The 
first innovation made individual agency statements comprehensible to other 
agencies as well as to the business community. The second created incentives 
for each agency to clearly specify the outputs that it planned to provide during 
the fiscal year, for which it could then be held accountable. The Fiscal Respon- 
sibility Act enhanced the transparency and accountability of  the government 
for aggregate fiscal discipline through full and frequent disclosure of aggregate 
fiscal information and benchmarking actual performance vis-A-vis published 
aggregate fiscal objectives. 
In terms of the summary features in table 10.1, the big changes occurred 
in the second and third columns. Prior to the reforms, most public financial 
statements and budgetary documents were not available to the general public 
for scrutiny, and, even if they were made available, they could not be easily 
understood even by  accountants and  financial experts in the private sector. 
Consequently, government performance was largely nontransparent. The Pub- 
lic Finance Act changed this dramatically. 
Accountability of line ministries was very weak as well. There were little or 
no reconciliations of ex ante provisions with ex post outcomes. Line ministries 
did not face a hard budget  constraint. Control of  their spending was done 
mostly through control of  their inputs by the central ministries. And because 
of these, it was not possible to impose sanctions against line ministries. In other 
words, line ministries had very little autonomy. Consequently, it was difficult to 
hold them accountable for their performance. The State Sector Act granted 
considerable autonomy to line ministries but made them accountable for out- 
puts. It introduced sanctions against nonperformance: the chief executive of a 
line ministry could be dismissed after his or her five-year contract expired and 
the executive’s compensation was based on the delivery of  key  outputs; em- 
ployees of the line ministry could be fired by the chief executive. And, in con- 
junction with the Public Finance Act, it made reconciliations de facto man- 
datory. 
Discussions of accountability and transparency rarely focus on the central 248  J. Edgardo Campos and Sanjay Pradhan 
ministries. This was certainly the case in New Zealand up to the mid- 1980s. In 
fact, there was a period in which the prime minister held the finance portfolio 
as well, a situation that could have easily led to fiscal mismanagement (which 
it did). But accountability and transparency  of the central ministries have be- 
come a crowning point of the reforms. The Fiscal Responsibility Act has bound 
the minister of finance to meeting clear-cut fiscal objectives, for example, cut- 
ting the deficit to 1 percent. These objectives constitute the outputs that (s)he 
is responsible for and provide the basis upon which her or his performance is 
judged and thus upon which her or his compensation and tenure depend." 
Accompanying  the  public-sector  reforms  were  measures  that  liberalized 
financial markets. As mentioned earlier, New Zealand was very much like a 
centrally planned economy prior to the reforms. Concomitantly, the financial 
sector was highly controlled. Beginning in the mid- 1980s, various measures 
were introduced to ease up the controls. By the early 1990s, financial markets 
were very much open to international flows. This is indicated by one measure 
of financial openness that shows the extent to which domestic real interest rates 
exceed world real interest rates. The index ranges from 0 to 1 in steps of tenths, 
for example, .1, .2, and so on, with higher numbers reflecting relatively greater 
openness of financial markets. For New Zealand, the average of the index from 
1980 to 1984 was around .3;  the average from 1990 to 1994 was .7. 
With regard to the institutional arrangements (the first column of table 10. l), 
the major changes occurred in the third (technical efficiency) and first (aggre- 
gate fiscal discipline) categories. As already mentioned, the permanent tenure 
of agency heads was abolished, and, in its place, a five-year performance con- 
tract based on clearly defined key outputs for agency heads (now referred to 
as chief executives) was introduced. In turn, agency heads were given the au- 
thority to hire and fire employees: the typical civil service personnel arrange- 
ment was turned on its head. With this also came a great deal of  autonomy 
over agency matters. Under the first category (aggregate fiscal discipline), the 
reforms introduced formal constraints on aggregate spending and the deficit 
via the Fiscal Responsibility Act. Comprehensiveness also improved since the 
output-based system forced line agencies to include all possible expenditures 
in their proposed budgets: budgets are structured in terms of seven classes of 
outputs; every expenditure had to fall into one of these classes. 
The New Zealand reforms have not been focused on the second category- 
strategic prioritization within the residual, core public sector. Up till recently, 
there has been no conscious effort to link agency outputs and thus expenditure 
allocations to strategic outcomes. Only beginning in 1994 was there some at- 
tempt to identify broad strategic priorities and to link annual budgetary consid- 
erations to these (medium- to long-term) priorities. 
In table  10.2, we  summarize  the  changes that the reforms  introduced in 
11. We note also that the contract of  the head of the central bank is tied to the inflation rate. 249  Budgetary Institutions and Expenditure Outcomes 
Table 10.2  The New Zealand Reforms 
Institutional Arrangements  Accountability  Transparency 
terms of  the categories and subcategories listed in table 10.1. Items that are 
shaded indicate the areas where the reforms introduced significant changes. 
Those that are not shaded represent arrangements or mechanisms that have not 
been the focus of the New Zealand reforms. 
Characterizing Pre- and Postreform Systems 
Using the methodology discussed earlier, we are able to capture the essential 
institutional changes that the above reforms introduced. We  derive slack co- 
efficients to both the prereform (circa 1983) and the postreform (circa 1994) 
systems of New  Zealand. The left side of figure 10.2 indicates the weighted 
indices for each arrangement (i.e., the height) and illustrates the relative slack 
of the prereform system with respect to the three categories. The corresponding 
slack coefficients are indicated in the upper right comer. The right side of the 
figure does the same for the postreform system. 250  J. Edgardo Campos and Sanjay Pradhan 
Slack = 74% 
Aggregate Fiscal Discipline, Prereform 
ABCDE 
Slack = 74% 
Prioritization, Prereform 
Slack = 6% 











Slack = 68% 
Technical Efficiency, Prereform 
Slack = 7% 
Technical Efficiency, Postreform 
A  B  C 
Fig. 10.2  Institutional changes in New Zealand 
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Correlating Systems with Outcomes 
From figure  10.2, we discern that the relative slack of the New Zealand 
system with respect to aggregate fiscal discipline is substantially smaller today 
than it was in the prereform era-a  slack coefficient of .06 versus .74. Corre- 
sponding to this has been a significant fall in the deficit-to-GDP ratio over the 
period 1984 to 1994, as indicated in figure 10.3. The ratio was about -9  per- 
cent in 1983 but gradually fell over the decade so that by  1994 it turned into a 
small surplus. 
Interestingly, the expenditure-to-GDP ratio fell less drastically from about 
38 percent in  1983 to around 35 percent in  1994. This is depicted in figure 
10.4. However as figure 10.5 illustrates, the composition of  spending changed 
markedly, with the share going to the development of industry falling from 
about 13 percent in  1983 to approximately 3 percent in 1994 and the share of 
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health from 7 percent to around 12 percent. Other expenditure ratios remained 
relatively constant. The slack coefficient of the system (and thus the relative 
slack) with respect to prioritization is correlated with this change. Circa 1983, 
the slack was  .74;  in  1995 it was  .48. A look at the left side of  figure 10.2 
indicates the possible weak points of  the prereform system with respect to 
prioritization. The system scores low on arrangements A, C, and E, which are 
arrangements that respectively deal with the articulation of strategic priorities, 
deal with the flexibility of  line agencies, and pertain to the use of  economic 
analysis in evaluating expenditures. The right side of  figure 10.2 shows that 
substantial changes were introduced to address C and E. Changes were also 
introduced to improve on B (the relative integration of the budget). The change 
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observed changes in the role of the state, which essentially involved a radical 
redirection of the role of government from one that supported state-owned en- 
terprises and intervened heavily in industry through massive regulation to one 
that aggressively encouraged the provision  of contestable goods and services 
by private industry. The articulation of strategic outcomes within the core pub- 
lic sector, however, remains weak. 
In terms of the capacity to achieve technical efficiency, the postreform sys- 
tem improved  significantly on the prerefonn system; the former has a slack 
coefficient of .07 and the latter .67. Unit cost data is not generally available 
except for a very limited sample of activities and only for a limited time period. 
The New  Zealand Treasury has conducted  a pilot  study of  productivity  im- 
provements in a small, select set of  activities. The study estimates average unit 
costs for select activities within four ministries. But as Scott and Ball (1996) 
comment, there were no adjustments made to inflation and there were a lot of 
qualifications. That is, the data must be interpreted with caution. 
Due to the request of the Treasury that the results be kept confidential (for 
the moment), we will label the concerned activities anonymously and indicate 
the changes in unit costs over time estimated for each of  them.I2  We emphasize 
that these results are very preliminary  and may change as the Treasury com- 
12. The Treasury released the study in late 1995; we will identify the activities and present data 
on changes in unit costs in subsequent research. 253  Budgetary Institutions and Expenditure Outcomes 
Table 10.3  Percentage Change in Unit Costs in New Zealand, Selected Activities 
Period  Percentage Change in 
Activities  of Study  Average Unit Costs 
A  1989-94  Fall of 10 to 20% 
B  1989-92  Rise of 25% 
1992-95  Fall of 25 to 30% 
C  1990-94  Fall of 10 to 40% 
D  1987-94  0%" 
"Unit cost levels dropped down to approximately 1989 levels. 
pletes its study. The results, which are indicated in table 10.3, suggest that unit 
costs are likely to have fallen between 1984 and 1994. This is consistent with 
the change in the ~1ack.l~ 
10.3.2  Australia 
Australia has instituted a medium-term expenditure framework, which fo- 
cuses the budget process on changes in strategic priorities within aggregate 
fiscal parameters. It has introduced measures that grant considerable flexibility 
to line agencies and provide them with incentives to identify savings options 
themselves. At the same time, the reforms have sought to focus attention on 
outcomes and introduce some form of  accountability, although these are not 
formalized. 
These reforms consist of six main, interrelated elements. First, a cornerstone 
of the Australian reforms has been a system of forward estimates, or three-year 
forecasts of the minimum cost of  existing policies and programs, which are 
automatically rolled into budgetary allocations if there is no change in policy. 
This has removed from ministerial consideration the bulk of  outlays in any 
budget that do not involve any changes in policies. Ministers now allocate the 
limited time for budget consideration to policy development rather than zero- 
basing an entire set of appropriations; indeed, this has freed up cabinet time 
as evidenced by  the decline in cabinet meetings from 370 in 1981 to 180 in 
1988-89  to 121 in 1989-90.  The lock-in feature has also provided line agen- 
cies with more certainty about present and future resources, thereby potentially 
enhancing technical efficiency. Finally, the requirement to publish a reconcilia- 
tion table that shows and explains the deviation between the forward estimates 
for the year and actual allocations in the annual budget, including their outyear 
implications, has served as a transparent and accountable mechanism for show- 
13. We  have also attempted a characterization of the pre- and postrefonn systems with equal 
weights on all arrangements (cum accountability/transparency mechanisms) in each of the three 
expenditure categories. The results  indicate that, within reasonable weighting parameters, our 
characterization has relatively robust ordinal properties, i.e., big changes remain big and small 
changes remain small (Campos and Pradhan 1996). 254  J. Edgardo Campos and Sanjay Pradhan 
ing areas of  policy  change  as well  as the  future demands on  resources of 
these policies. 
Second, mechanisms for macroeconomic planning reconcile the forward es- 
timates with the target deficit to identify the scope for new spending and sav- 
ings. Aggregate fiscal discipline in the determination of target deficits has in 
turn been induced by public commitments to aggregate targets (e.g., the Hawke 
government’s trilogy of commitments not to increase spending and taxes, and 
to reduce the deficit) and implicitly enforced through open financial markets 
and media. Third, decision-making mechanisms were instituted at a political 
level through the “Trilaterals” and the Expenditure Review Committee (ERC) 
of the cabinet to decide upon competing priorities for spending and savings to 
achieve the  net  fiscal  targets.  Individual  portfolios  are  required  to  submit 
spending and savings proposals to stay within their targets, but it is up to the 
ERC to decide whether to choose only the  savings or spending options, or 
both. Fourth, a system of portfolio budgeting was introduced. This devolves 
priority setting to individual portfolios by encouraging and requiring line agen- 
cies to themselves identify savings and spending options within their portfolio 
to meet their net savings targets. This capitalizes on the superior information 
of line agencies by inducing them to identify their least cost-effective program 
in order to fund new programs. Fifth, the development of the running-costs 
system further devolved authority within departments or portfolios. All admin- 
istrative and salary expenses, which previously consisted of 20 or more items, 
were consolidated into a single running-cost item, and department managers 
were given the authority to allocate this expenditure item to various inputs- 
including staff numbers and salaries-as  they  saw fit. Additional flexibility 
was provided by allowing agencies to bring forward or carry over running costs 
between  years, up to a limit of  10 percent.  A  partial quid pro quo for this 
freedom is the annual efficiency dividend of  1 percent that agencies are ex- 
pected to achieve in their running costs every year. 
Finally, while portfolio budgeting and the running-cost system devolved au- 
thority to line agencies, program management and budgeting was introduced 
to focus attention on outcomes. This entailed classification of portfolio activi- 
ties into programs, and introduction of accountability mechanisms by requiring 
departments to report on the performance of programs within their portfolios. 
At the same time, ex post evaluation was introduced to assess whether pro- 
grams were achieving their intended results.  Various reviews, however, have 
concluded that program budgeting and evaluation has had limited impact on 
budgetary allocations, but has helped create a performance-oriented culture. 
Using the methodology above, we are able to characterize the principal fea- 
tures of  these reforms,  and assign  slack coefficients to both  prereform  and 
postreform systems. As shown in figure 10.6, the coefficients corroborate our 
qualitative findings that the greatest emphasis in the Australian reforms has 
been on improving strategic prioritization  (i.e., slack coefficient declined from 
80 percent to 12  percent) and aggregate fiscal discipline (i.e., reduction in coef- 255  Budgetary Institutions and Expenditure Outcomes 
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Fig. 10.6  Institutional changes in Australia 
ficient from 84 percent to 20 percent). At the same time, there has been less 
emphasis on introducing measures for accountability to enhance technical ef- 
ficiency. 
The reforms have had a dramatic impact on the level and composition of 
spending. Aggregate budgetary outlays declined from 29.8 percent of GDP in 
1984-85  to 23.7 percent in 1989-90. This involved three consecutive years of 
negative real growth in outlays (1987-88  to  1989-90)  and four years of re- 
sulting budget surplus (1986-87  to 1990-91). The budget deficit moved from 
4.1 percent of GDP in 1983-84 to a surplus of 2 percent of GDP in 1989-90! 
The reduction in forward estimates of  outlays from  1987 was even more 
dramatic than the reduction in  actual expenditures. Figure 10.7 shows that 
there was a strong tendency in the early 1980s for forward estimates of outlays 
on existing outlays to rise steeply. This meant that the reduction in  annual 
growth of spending involved a double task: reversal of growth in forward esti- 256  J. Edgardo Campos and Sanjay Pradhan 
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Fig. 10.7  Budget and forward estimates, cumulative real growth, Australia 
Source: Dixon 1996,229. 
Note: Excludes asset sales. 
mates to bring spending down to the preceding year, and further reductions in 
spending to achieve net declines. From 1987, however, the forward estimates 
of outlays begin to show declines in the outyears, under the influence of budget 
decisions that reduced outlays over a period of time. 
What is striking about the Australian experience is that these dramatic cuts 
were achieved by  significant changes in the composition of  intrasectoral ex- 
penditures on account of  savings identified by  line agencies themselves  (fig. 
10.8).  The distribution of  real savings measures undertaken  by  line agencies 
shows that the spending cuts involved some major policy shifts, particularly in 
the social security function, where a much higher degree of outlays targeting 
was achieved. However, the bulk of the changes in expenditure composition 
came from measures of  a highly  activity-specific  nature, involving program 
redesign and elimination of particular, less cost-effective aspects of program 
spending.  These achievements  contrast  sharply  with  an  attempt  to reduce 
spending by an earlier administration in the early 1980s, which unsuccessfully 
tried  to eliminate redundant  functions  in  a centralized  manner  and  merely 
ended up making modest reductions through across-the-board cuts. 
10.3.3  New Zealand versus Australia: A Comparison 
New  Zealand and Australia are often  mentioned together as being at the 
cutting edge of institutional reform. Our analysis above reveals that while they 
share some important principles in their reform efforts, they have by and large 
taken dramatically different paths, which provide quite separate paradigms for 
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1981-82 to 1993-94) 
Perhaps the most important shared characteristic of the two reforms is that 
they each have sought to alter underlying incentives that govern the allocation 
and use of  resources. Within this, a common feature is transparency, which 
binds key players to particular fiscal outcomes and makes it costly for them 
to misbehave. Transparency pervades all key aspects of the New Zealand re- 
forms-for  example, explicit delineation of outputs, the contracts of chief ex- 
ecutives, budgetary appropriations explicitly based upon outputs purchased, 
publication of balance sheets showing net worth of  government, and legisla- 
tively mandated full and frequent disclosure. In Australia, transparency is best 
exemplified in the requirement to publish a reconciliation table for the forward 
estimates, explicitly indicating how much particular outlays were changed in 
the annual budget vis-8-vis the forward estimates, the reasons behind these 
changes, and their outyear implications. 
Another shared feature is considerable devolution to line agencies to per- 
form their tasks. In both countries, this has created incentives that make it 
worthwhile for line agencies to identify savings, and move  them toward  a 
greater interest in both allocative and technical efficiency. In New  Zealand, 
chief executives have complete autonomy over the allocation of inputs to pro- 
duce the outputs, including the right to hire and fire. In Australia, all adminis- 
trative expenses of line agencies have been consolidated into a single running- 
cost item, and managers have complete flexibility in the allocation of  these 
costs across inputs, including staff numbers and  salaries. Further, portfolio 
budgeting in Australia devolves priority setting to individual departments, en- 
couraging them to identify the specific spending and savings measures to meet 258  J. Edgardo Campos and Sanjay Pradhan 





Fig. 10.9  Emphasis of reforms in New Zealand and Australia 
Note:  AFD = aggregate fiscal discipline. PR = priority setting. TE = technical efficiency. 
their net fiscal targets. Another shared feature is contestability in service deliv- 
ery. In both countries, there is a strong emphasis on unbundling the provision 
of public services, and introducing competition in service delivery-including 
from the private sector-in  order to achieve technically efficient outcomes. 
While New Zealand has gone much farther down this route, Australia too has 
instituted explicit measures for contestability-even  for policy advice. 
A final common characteristic has been a binding commitment to aggregate 
$fiscal discipline. Each country has publicly committed itself to targets for fiscal 
prudence and has instituted mechanisms that facilitate the achievement of fis- 
cal targets. At the same time, the openness of financial markets and the media 
have provided an external disciplining mechanism to ensure adherence to pru- 
dent fiscal targets. 
Past this, however, Australia and New Zealand have adopted dramatically 
different  reforms to achieve  aggregate  fiscal discipline. A principal  distin- 
guishing feature has been the relative emphasis placed on technical efJiciency 
in New Zealand as opposed to strategic priority setting in Australia. This is 
clearly revealed in their relative slack measures corresponding to the two out- 
comes as shown in figure 10.9.  This in turn reflects relative emphasis on techni- 
cal efficiency in the delivery of outputs (i.e., goods and services produced) in 
New Zealand, as opposed to the cost-effective achievement of outcomes (i.e., 
the impact of outputs on beneficiaries) in Australia. The different reforms in 
the two countries have been path-dependent,  reflecting the particular  back- 
ground and historical conditions driving each reform. 
On the eve of reforms, New Zealand inherited an overexpanded public sec- 
tor not dissimilar to the command economies of the former socialist countries. 
Consequently, a principal emphasis was on restructuring the role of the state 
by privatizing large chunks of the public sector. This extended itself into the 
paradigm of  instituting  private-sector  incentive mechanisms within  the  re- 
maining core public sector in order to achieve technical efficiency in the de- 
livery of outputs. There is a strong emphasis on formal contracts for account- 
ability  in the efficient delivery of  outputs. Management contracts  between 259  Budgetary Institutions and Expenditure Outcomes 
ministers and chief executives, as well as budgetary appropriations, have been 
based upon outputs. 
By contrast, the Australian reforms were launched when a preceding admin- 
istration had been unsuccessful in reducing public spending by identifying re- 
dundant functions. A centralized, top-down Commonwealth Review of Func- 
tions failed to identify egregious anomalies in the role of the state in Australia. 
Consequently, the Australian reforms sought to rely on a more nuanced and 
finely surgical process of identifying savings. They did so by focusing the bud- 
get process on changes in strategic priorities, and relying heavily on line agen- 
cies to themselves identify savings options. The system seeks to achieve results 
by creating an environment in which strategic priorities are articulated at the 
political level, and managers are given considerable flexibility-through  port- 
folio budgeting  and the running-cost  system-to  achieve the intended  out- 
comes. The system seeks to achieve accountability through reporting on per- 
formance and ex post evaluations, but there are no formal outcome- or output- 
based contracts. 
Consequently,  in  Australia,  tightly  specified  accountability  mechanisms 
based on outputs, as in New Zealand, have been sacrificed in favor of a greater 
collective as well as individual focus on outcomes. This reflects a fundamen- 
tally different philosophical emphasis driving the two reform efforts, with Aus- 
tralia placing a greater faith on trust and consensual relationships  and New 
Zealand instituting formal accountability mechanisms to resolve incentive in- 
compatibility stemming from a principal-agent paradigm. 
The weakness of the New Zealand system is that with everyone focused on 
outputs and technical efficiency, the link with outcomes has been overlooked 
until recently. The broad priorities (so-called SRAs and KRAs-see  sec. 10.4) 
have only recently been implemented to forge a closer link with outcomes. The 
weakness of the Australian system rests in much looser systems of accountabil- 
ity. However, this is necessitated to some extent by a federal structure wherein 
a large percentage of services are delivered by state governments. 
It is worth asking whether a country could not merely adopt the best of the 
two countries’ systems-that  is, a focus on strategic priorities as well as tech- 
nical efficiency. In a world without transactions costs, one could well envisage 
a system where there is a focus on outcomes, which is then translated into 
corresponding outputs through formalized contracts. However, our compara- 
tive analysis of the Australian and New Zealand reforms indicates that this is 
easier said than done. Australia adopted a strategy that began with an emphasis 
primarily on improving strategic prioritization. Given the much greater impor- 
tance of policymaking at the central government level induced by its federal 
structure, the benefits relative to the transactions costs of improving strategic 
prioritization  were likely to be higher than the net benefits from improving 
technical efficiency. In New Zealand, initial reforms were indeed geared to- 
ward  strategic  prioritization,  given  the  vastly  overextended  public  sector: 
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mercial outputs generated substantial early dividends. Having done this to the 
extent politically feasible, reforms then turned to improving the technical effi- 
ciency of remaining public agencies. 
10.4  Recent Developments 
Recent developments in both New Zealand and Australia suggest that the 
two reforms  are converging  toward  some common  paradigm.  In particular, 
each is placing greater emphasis on the level of expenditure outcome that has 
hitherto not been sufficiently addressed. 
Recently in New Zealand, there have been concerns that formal contracting 
has led to a massive volume of specification and reporting requirements and 
thus detracted from attention to strategic policymaking (Schick 1996). In re- 
sponse to this, New Zealand has initiated reforms to improve strategic planning 
and budgeting (Boston and Pallot  1997). In particular, a focused set of broad 
strategic  outcomes-so-called  strategic result  areas  (SRAs)  and key  result 
areas (KRAs)-were  identified. Budgetary priorities as well as contracts of 
chief executives now more explicitly focus on SRAs and KRAs. As noted by 
Schick (1996, 86), “through the SRAs and KRAs, the medium (and longer) 
term perspective  mandated by  the  Fiscal  Responsibility Act,  and increased 
planning,  the  strategic  capacity  of  Government  departments  has  been  up- 
graded. What is most pleasing about this development is that it has been ac- 
complished  in  ways  that  comport  with  the  logic  and  practice  of  the  New 
Zealand model. The SRAs and KRAs emphasize the ex ante specification of 
objectives, as do other elements of  the New Zealand system, and the Fiscal 
Responsibility Act upholds the value of transparency in public policy.” Inevita- 
bly, further work will need to be undertaken in refining outcome measures and 
instituting ex post evaluation systems. 
In Australia, the thrust of the reform process was changed significantly in 
1996 with the election of a Liberal government that believed in a more mini- 
malist public sector than its predecessor. The new government required agen- 
cies to step up the  search for activities that might be effectively  performed 
within a purchaser-provider framework, while also according greater freedom 
to set their own terms and conditions of employment. 
This more rapid transition to provision of public services by  arm’s-length 
contractors has created a difficult hurdle for a public sector hitherto driven by 
outcome (rather than output) reporting by its agencies. While the emphasis on 
program objectives and outcomes over the previous decade had focused agen- 
cies on how far their programs were furthering the government’s objectives, it 
did little to assist the preparation of contracts with arm’s-length service provid- 
ers that clearly defined the “deliverables”  expected by  the government (such 
as cost, quantity, quality, and timeliness) in return for the funding provided to 
the contractor. The increased pace of contracting out has therefore triggered a 
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mation with clearly defined measures of  program outputs for which service 
providers can be held contractually responsible. This new focus on outputs is 
intended to augment rather than displace the long-standing focus on outcomes, 
and may  be incorporated in the accrual budgeting framework (ensuring the 
proper costing of outputs) by  1999-2000.  It remains to be seen whether the 
rediscovery of  an output focus in a public sector that had long focused on 
outcome measures for its programs will result in a distinctively Australian style 
of  purchaser-provider relationship that blends strengths from both perspec- 
tives. 
10.5  Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we have developed a methodology for evaluating the quality 
of a public expenditure management system. Using theories developed within 
the field of the new institutional economics and the reform experiences of Aus- 
tralia and New Zealand with public expenditure management, we have been 
able to identify key institutional arrangements that affect aggregate fiscal disci- 
pline, strategic prioritization, and technical efficiency in the use of budgeted 
resources. We  have argued that these arrangements can be effective only if 
there are mechanisms that bind public officials to these arrangements. By this 
we mean that public officials will incur a sufficiently high cost if they violate 
the arrangements. Within the limitations of our data, we have been able to show 
that certain mechanisms that enhance transparency and accountability can in- 
deed introduce such costs and thus lead to better expenditure outcomes. 
Our comparative analysis of the Australian and New Zealand reforms high- 
lighted the importance of interactions and potential trade-offs among the three 
levels of expenditure outcomes. Our findings and framework have enabled us 
to analyze the impact of donor assistance on the three interrelated levels in aid- 
dependent countries. 
While we have managed to capture the essence of the Australian and New 
Zealand reforms with our approach, we  have still not reached the point  at 
which we can recommend with confidence which elements of the reforms will 
work  and  which will  not  in  a different context, for example, developing- 
country institutional environments. Indeed there have been some attempts in a 
developing-country context to push a New  Zealand type of  reform program 
without adequate attention to the replicability or adaptability of these reforms. 
As Levy and Spiller (1996) have  shown within the context of the design of 
regulatory systems, the replicability problem is very  complex and requires 
in-depth comparative analysis across countries of  more fundamental under- 
pinnings, and their mapping onto specific institutional arrangements. In the 
context of budgetary systems, the more fundamental underpinnings that will 
influence replicability include, for instance, administrative capacity, enforce- 
ability of  the rule of law, and the relationship between the executive and the 
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Though this chapter attempts to develop a coherent framework for under- 
standing a public expenditure management system, the set of issues involved 
are admittedly very complex. Our proposed  methodology offers a first cut. 
Further research can fine-tune this methodology and in particular attempt to 
explore in further detail the transactions costs inherent in the trade-offs among 
the three levels of expenditure outcomes. 
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